AIDS Antibody Testing and Health Insurance Underwriting: A Paradigmatic Inquiry by Berman, Judith A.
NOTE
AIDS Antibody Testing and Health Insurance
Underwriting: A Paradigmatic Inquiry
I. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AIDS AND THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY
A. Introduction
The incidence of AIDS (Aquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome) in the United
States has engendered a response not seen since the polio epidemic of the 1940s. The
disease is poorly understood and the fear of contagion is pervasive. Although efforts
to prevail over the disease are unified in purpose, there is sharp division over who
should bear the costs associated with the disease.
By the end of 1991, the U.S. Public Health Service (USPHS) estimates that the
cumulative number of AIDS cases in America will be more than 270,000.1 Twenty
to thirty percent of these cases will come from the one to one and one half million
Americans presently infected with the "AIDS virus.''2 The USPHS conservatively
estimates that the direct health care costs associated with AIDS in 1991 will be
approximately 8 billion dollars, representing 1.2 to 2.4 percent of the expected total
health care expenditures in 1991.3 Private health insurers assert that their financial
solvency is threatened by the economic impact of AIDS, and, thus, they must be
permitted to use currently available screening tests to exclude from coverage those
persons diagnosed or those who could be diagnosed as having AIDS. 4
Much of the criticism against health insurer's use of AIDS antibody testing
centers on the test's discriminatory effect.5 A less publicized, yet equally compelling,
argument against testing also exists. AIDS antibody testing by health insurers
highlights the increasing problem of uninsurability in America and calls into question
the propriety of using blood testing to screen insurance applicants for diseases less
notorious than AIDS. 6
I. Coolfont Report: A PHS Plan for Prevention and Control of AIDS and the AIDS Virus, 101 PuB. HEALTH REP.
341, 342 (1986) [hereinafter Coolfont Report].
2. Id. at 342.
3. Id. at 348. The $8 billion figure is based on a projection of 71,000 present AIDS patients being alive in 1991
and 74,000 new cases by that date. An additional 29,000 cases were added to account for 20% underreporting of the cases.
The cost per patient is calculated at S46,000. Id. This cost per patient has been disputed. One widely publicized article
estimated hospitalization costs of approximately S147,000 per case. Hardy, Rauch, Echenberg, Morgan, Curran, The
Economic Impact of the First 10,000 Cases ofAcquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome in the United States, 255 J. A.M.A.
209, 210 (1986); see also Scitovsky & Rice, Estimates of the Direct and Indirect Costs of Acquired Immunodeficiency
Syndrome in the United States, 1985, 1986 and 1991, 102 Pvn. HEALTH REP. 5 (1987) [hereinafter Scitovsky] (predicting
that, by 1991, only medical expenses of victims of automobile accidents will exceed the medical costs of AIDS patients).
See also Fox & Thomas, AIDS Cost Analysis and Social Policy, 15 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 186, 207 (1987/88).
4. See Clifford & Iuculano, AIDS and Insurance: The Rationale for AIDS-Related Testing, 100 HARV. L. REv.
1806 (1987) [hereinafter Clifford]; Hoffman & Kincaid, AIDS: The Challenge to Life and Health Insurers' Freedom of
Contract, 35 DRAKE L. REv. 709, 770 (1986) [hereinafter Hoffmanl.
5. Critics argue that testing gives insurers an inexpensive and easy means to practice sexual orientation
discrimination while avoiding the administrative complexities of attempting to identify the relatively "invisible"
homosexual person from the rest of the population. See Schatz, The AIDS Insurance Crisis: Underwriting or
Overreaching?, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1782, 1791 (1987) [hereinafter Schatz]; Pear, Study Finds Most Health Insurers
Screen Applicants for AIDS Virus, N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1988, at I, col. 2.
6. See Schatz, supra note 5, at 1798; see also infra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
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This Comment will examine the latter issue7 from the perspective of the health
insurance industry and from that of "AIDS testing" opponents. The purpose of this
Comment is to evaluate the justifications for such testing in an objective manner
which provides a methodology for the evaluation of future, non-AIDS related
insurance screening. The twin goals of efficient risk classification and fair risk
distribution traditionally have been used to assess the justification for other forms of
insurance risk classifications. 8 Therefore, AIDS antibody testing by health insurers
will be measured against these goals. Before turning to this analysis, an overview of
AIDS and AIDS antibody testing is necessary for a complete understanding of the
issues.
B. AIDS and AIDS Antibody Testing
A wealth of information exists on the "AIDS virus" and its methods of
transmission;9 this Comment will review, only briefly, the way the disease is spread
and will focus on AIDS antibody testing.
AIDS is the clinical manifestation of a dysfunction of the human immune system
caused by the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV). 10 The virus is blood-borne and
is transmitted through an exchange of body fluids (typically during sexual inter-
course) or through the use of contaminated blood or blood products.I Once present
in the body, the virus, by a process of genetic transcription,' 2 infects the body's T-4
lymphocytes, a group of white blood cells responsible for triggering an immune
response to certain organisms commonly present in large portions of the population.'
3
Once established in the immune system, HIV may remain dormant for months or
years before it begins to divide and overwhelm the T-4 lymphocytes. Once these
lymphocytes are destroyed, the immune system fails and the body is defenseless
against opportunistic infections; death is inevitable. 14
When a foreign substance or antigen, such as HIV, enters the body, the B-cells
7. For a detailed examination of the former issue, see Schatz, supra note 5; see also Leonard, Employment
Discrimination Against Persons with AIDS, 10 U. DAYTON L. REV. 681 (1985) [hereinafter Leonard I; Leonard, AIDS
and Emploment Law Revisited, 14 HoFSTRA L. Rev. 11 (1985) [hereinafter Leonard II; AIDS: Introduction and Overview,
EMPLOYMENT TESTING (Univ. Public. of Am. 1987) [hereinafter EmpLOYmENT ESTINO].
8. See infra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., AIDS: FACTS AND ISSUES (V. Gong & R. Rudnick eds. 1986); AIDS: A BAStc GUIDE FOe CLItcIANs
(P. Ebbesen, R. Bigger & M. Melbye eds. 1984); Gallo, The AIDS Virus, 256 SciENrruc At., Jan. 1987, at 46.
10. Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) is the internationally recognized name for the virus believed to cause
AIDS. It is also known as HTLV-IIt (human T-lymphotropic virus type III) and LAV (lymphadenopathy associated virus).
This Comment will employ the HIV convention. See Vogel, Discrimination on the Basis of HIV Infection: An Economic
Analysis, 49 OHtO ST. L.J. 965, 967 n.18 (1989).
11. Closen, Connor, Kaufman & Wojcik, AIDS: Testing Democracy-Irrational Responses to the Public Health
Crisis and the Need for Privacy in Serologic Testing, 19 J. MARSHALL . REv. 835, 864-71 (1986) [hereinafter Closen];
Leonard It, supra note 7, at 17. HIV has been detected in tears and saliva although no transmission from these fluids has
been reported. The sharing of hypodermic needles by intravenous drug abusers accounts for 25% of the cases. Coolfont
Report, supra note 1, at 343. The transmission of the virus by tainted blood products is anticipated to decrease because
of screening procedures currently in place. See id. at 344. HIV may also be passed to infants prenatally or during the birth
process. Estimates suggest that more than 3,000 cases will be diagnosed in infants and children by 1991. Id. at 343;
Leonard II, supra note 7, at 17; EMPLOYmENT TESTING, supra note 7, at A:3.
12. See Gottlieb, Immunologic Aspects of the Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome and Male Homosexuality, 70
MED. CLINtcS N. Am. 651, 657 (1986).
13. Leonard II, supra note 7, at 18.
14. Id. at 18-19; EMPLOYMENT TESTING, supra note 7, at A:2.
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of the immune system respond defensively by producing a specific antibody to the
antigen. The antibodies, in addition to attacking the antigen, "memorize" this
response to the antigen. This memorization process, called seroconversion, is
inferential evidence of exposure to the virus.1 5
In 1985, a blood test became available that can identify the antibody produced
in response to the "AIDS virus."1 6 Enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA)
was originally licensed by the Food and Drug Administration to screen donated
blood. 17 Because of its ten to fifteen percent inaccuracy rate, it is recommended that
a positive ELISA test be confirmed by the Western blot technique, currently the most
accurate and most expensive test available. 8
A true positive (seropositive) test result can indicate one of two things. First, the
individual may have been exposed to the "AIDS virus" and successfully repelled it,
with the antibodies remaining "in memory." As is true with other viruses, the body
may confine the virus to the lymphatic system, the primary site of the immune cells.
This individual may experience transitory enlargement of the lymph nodes, but
probably will not develop the full syndrome associated with AIDS. 19 Alternatively,
a seropositive test result can indicate that there has been exposure to the "AIDS
virus" and both antibodies and antigens are circulating in the bloodstream. In this
case, the individual carries the live virus (antigen) and can transmit it. It is probable
that at some point, the individual may have or may develop AIDS or AIDS Related
Complex (ARC).20
Despite its high level of inaccurate results, the ELISA test has been adopted by
private employers and the federal government in an attempt to exclude seropositive
individuals from the workplace. 21 In addition, insurance companies have seized upon
AIDS antibody testing as a means to evaluate availability of health and life insurance
coverage to seropositive individuals. 22
The use of the ELISA test by health insurers to deny coverage is problematic for
several reasons. First, the high incidence of false positive results casts doubt upon the
test's medical reliability, especially because not all insurance companies use the
Western blot technique to confirm a positive result.23 Second, a negative antibody
15. Closen, supra note 11, at 860, 861.
16. Leonard II, supra note 7, at 11.
17. ELISA was intended as a screening test; it has no prognostic or predictive value. E.,uLo Ire.r TEsTING, supra
note 7, at A:5.
18. Id.
19. Closen, supra note 11, at 860. Although this scenario is theoretically possible, studies have shown that a copy
of the viral genetic material becomes an integral and permanent component of the DNA of an infected individual. Thus,
such an individual is likely to be a carrier for life and is assumed to be capable of transmitting the virus. Coolfont Report,
supra note 1, at 342; E. tLoYm-rr Ttsno, supra note 7, at A:5.
20. ,EnLomt E TES - G, supra note 7, at A:5; Closen, supra note 11, at 860. ARC is a diagnostic set of
symptomatology that includes fever, nightsweats, weight loss, diarrhea, and fatigue. Persons with ARC may progress to
AIDS although this is not a certainty. Closen, supra note 11, at 860.
21. E.,%PLoYMENr TESTmG, supra note 7, at A:5; Leonard II, supra note 7, at 13.
22. E.nmLoystrsr TrsrsNo, supra note 7, at A:5. This Comment focuses on the use of AIDS antibody testing by
health insurers to exclude individuals from health care coverage. The use of the test by life insurers raises some similar
issues but is beyond the scope of this Comment; see, e.g., Life Insurers Terrified by AIDS: Schweiker, 91 NAT'L
UNoE r' Et, Apr. 13, 1987, at 6 (Life Health/Financial Services ed.).
23. See supra note 18 and accompanying text; see also Schatz, supra note 5, at 1782 n.25, 1784. False positives
have been associated with hepatitis, alcoholic liver disease, kidney dialysis, syphilis, and with particular manufacturers.
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test does not rule out exposure to the virus. The individual may have been exposed
and not yet seroconverted, or the individual's antibody levels may have dropped to
undetectable levels.24
Even assuming a seropositive test result, the predictive value of the ELISA test
for morbidity and mortality is not yet established. The risk of developing AIDS after
exposure to HIV is a subject of debate. Some researchers estimate that the risk of
developing AIDS after exposure to HIV is one to ten percent, and twenty to forty
percent for developing ARC.25 The Center for Disease Control (CDC) estimates that
twenty to thirty percent of individuals who test seropositive will develop AIDS over
the next five years, and another twenty-five percent of those who test seropositive
will develop ARC within two to five years. 26 With such uncertainty attendant to the
ELISA test, an exclusion of health care coverage on the basis of a seropositive test
result is speculative and inequitable.
C. The Debate
That AIDS and ARC will result in significant health care expenditures in the
future is beyond dispute; because of the United State's reliance on privately funded
health insurance, private insurers and insureds will bear these costs. The health
insurance industry takes the position that these anticipated high losses justify the use
of AIDS antibody testing in an effort to limit the costs and protect the economic
stability of the health insurance industry. 27
However, legislation recently enacted in several states forbids AIDS antibody
testing by insurers.28 Such bans on testing evidence concern for the test's inaccuracy,
for its potentially discriminatory effect, and for its confidentiality problems. Insurers
respond that any prohibition on testing would represent an "unprecedented departure
from an insurers [sic] traditional ability to underwrite with access to all pertinent
medical information. ' 2 9 Hindering an insurer's ability to assess risk is said to
"[undercut] the industry's financial stability and [compromise] its ability to pay
See Letter, False-positive HIV Antibody Tests in RPR-Reactive Patients, 260 J.A.M.A. 923 (1988); see also Fleming,
Cochi, Steece & Hull, Acquired Inmunodeficiency Syndrome in Low-Incidence Areas, 258 J.A.M.A. 785, 787 (1987).
The insurance industry refutes the unreliability argument. The industry states that insurers commonly administer a
follow-up ELISA, and if positive, a Western blot. This triple testing is said to produce a 99.9% reliability. Clifford, supra
note 4, at 1812, 1812 n.36. A recent study using civilian applicants for U.S. Military service concluded that ELISA can
have an acceptably low false positive rate. The statistical method used. however, does not withstand close scrutiny.
Therefore, this finding is of doubtful significance. See Burke, et al., Measurement of the Folse Positive Rate in a
Screening Program for Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infections, 319 NEW ENo. J. MED. 961 (1988).
24. Closen, supra note 11, at 864; Hough, Individual Health Insurance and AIDS, 27 SocroEcoSo~tc REP. 1, 3
(1987) [hereinafter Hough].
25. Closen, supra note 11, at 860.
26. See Clifford, supra note 4, at 1813. In terms of medical costs, ARC is roughly equivalent to AIDS. Hough,
supra note 24, at 3.
27. See Clifford, supra note 4; Scherzer, Insurance, in AIDS AND THE LAw: A GUIDE FOR THE PuaLC 185, 190-96
(H. Dalton & S. Burnis eds. 1987).
28. CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 199.21(f) (West Supp. 1988); D.C. CODE ANN. § 35-223(b)(2) (1988); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 631.90(2)(3) (Vest Supp. 1987).
29. Cost of AIDS Care and Who Is Going to Pay: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Health and the Env't of the
House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 303 (1985) (statement of Donald Chambers, M.D.,
President of Health Insurance Association of America) [hereinafter Congressional Hearings]; see also Clifford, supra
note 4, at 1813-14.
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future claims." 30 The inability to classify individuals based on seropositivity causes
adverse selection and undermines the financial well-being of the health insurance
industry.
Adverse selection is the process by which high risk individuals tend to purchase
more coverage than they would if the price accurately reflected the risk, resulting in
an unfair subsidization in coverage of the high risk group by the low risk
population. 3t An information imbalance exists, with the insured in a position superior
to the insurer. The fear is that "through inadequate rates, large insurance purchases
by high-risk individuals, or perhaps the withdrawal of standard risks from the
market," ' 32 the insurer faces eventual financial ruin.
In the health insurance field, insurers normally protect themselves from the
effects of adverse selection by the use of a "pre-existing condition" clause in the
insurance policy. 33 Pre-existing condition clauses limit or exclude benefits for an
injury or illness that existed during a specified period of time prior to a person's
becoming insured. A positive AIDS antibody test taken before the commencement of
coverage would trigger a pre-existing condition exclusion. 34 However, due to the
lengthy AIDS latency period, the protection normally afforded an insurer through
these clauses is diminished substantially. 35 The deleterious effect of adverse
selection, although more commonly encountered in the life insurance area, 36 is a
valid concern for health insurers.
Insurers also argue that restrictions on testing would constitute "unfair discrim-
ination." Unfair discrimination is an insurance industry concept which can be un-
derstood best by examining its obverse, "fair discrimination." Fair discrimination in
the insurance underwriting context requires insurers to segregate insureds into classes
of "like risk and exposure," and to charge "a premium commensurate with the risk
and exposure." ' 37 The industry asserts that persons who have been infected by the
"AIDS virus" are not of the same class and risk as those who have not been infected. 38
To include them in the group of nonexposed would violate the underlying concept that
30. Clifford, supra note 4, at 1815.
31. K. ABRAHAm, DISTRIBUrING RISK INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC PoLIcY 15 (1986) [hereinafter
ABRAhmSt]; Clifford, supra note 4, at 1817; Hammond & Shapiro, AIDS and the Limits of Insurability, 64 MILBANK Q.
143, 150-51 (1986) [hereinafter Hammond].
32. Hammond, supra note 31, at 151. The problem of adverse selection is relevant to group insurance plans, but
is treated differently. High risk individuals cannot purchase increased coverage and low risk individuals usually cannot
leave the plan because group insurance, commonly provided through an employer, is usually involuntary. See J. CutMINS,
B. SrrH, R. VANCE & J. VANDERHE , RISK CLASSIFCAmoN IN LIF INSURANcE 89 (1983) [hereinafter CurMMINS].
33. See Clifford, supra note 4, at 1819-20.
34. See id. at 1820.
35. See id. Usually, these clauses limit or exclude benefits for an injury or sickness that existed three to six months
before becoming insured. Id. at 1819.
36. See id. at 1817; Milligan, The Politics of Fear, 21 INsr'L INV., 125, 127 (Dec. 1987); Arndt, AIDS, As Yet
Leaves Most Agents Unaffected, 91 NAT'L UNDERWRrER, Apr. 27, 1987, at 2 (Life Health/Financial Services ed.). For
a case supporting rescission of a life insurance contract based on nondisclosure of medical information at the time of
application see Zachary Trading, Inc. v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 668 F. Supp. 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (failure
to disclose medical consultations for symptoms indicative of AIDS held to be misrepresentation).
37. WASH. AtIN. CODE § 284-90-010(2) (1986); see, e.g., Physicians Mut. Ins. Co. v. Denenberg, 15 Pa.
Commw. 509, 327 A.2d 415 (1974) (premium rate of $1.00 for first month of coverage for health insurance policy
constitutes unfair discrimination); Mahone v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 561 P.2d 142 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976)
(restriction of disability benefits for people over age 60 does not constitute unfair discrimination).
38. See Clifford, supra note 4, at 1815. See also Hoffman, supra note 4, at 719.
10631989]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49:1059
each insured pay according to what he or she receives rather than being subsidized by
others. 39 Accordingly, state statutes codifying the unfair discrimination doctrine 40 are
said to impose an affirmative duty on health insurers to segregate insureds with
identifiable, serious health risks from those without serious health risks. 41
This statutory interpretation has been challenged by at least one critic, who
argues against any implied legislative encouragement of the use of classifiers. 42 First,
the wording and history of typical unfair discrimination statutes demonstrate an intent
to treat insureds equally, rather than an intent to develop and use more refined
classifications. 43 Second, recent case law, although scant, 44 suggests that statistical
association with loss need not be the sole basis for assessing the validity of a
particular classification. 45 Other factors, such as "causality, reliability, social
acceptability, [and] incentive value" are relevant. 46 For example, in 1981, the
Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed the state insurance commissioner's decision
to allocate the losses in the state motor vehicle reinsurance pool among all state
insureds rather than fixing rates solely on the experience of the insureds within the
pool. 47 The court recognized that the policy of ensuring the availability of motor
vehicle insurance to all, including high risk drivers, was an element to be considered
in assessing the fairness of the underwriting scheme. 48
Such public policy concerns are particularly relevant in the area of health
insurance and must be factored into any analysis of the unfair discrimination
argument posited by insurers. One of the primary arguments against the use of the
ELISA test as a health insurance classifier is the concern that a large segment of the
population will suffer the effects of uninsurability because of a positive AIDS
39. See Wortham, Insurance Classification: Too Important to be Left to the Actuaries, 19 U. MICH. J. L. RE. 349,
361, 371 (1986) [hereinafter Wortham I].
40. All states and the District of Columbia have statutes modeled after the Unfair Trade Practices Act. The Act,
developed by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), prohibits "unfair," i.e., actually unjustified,
"discrimination between individuals of the same class and equal expectation of life." An Act Relating to Unfair Methods
of Competition and Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices in the Business of Insurance, 1972 PROCEtINGS OF a
NATIONAL AssocIToN OF INSURANCE OMMISSSoNs 511, 512 § 4(7)(1)-(b). Schatz, supra note 5, at 1789-90 n.53. For
a listing of individual state statutes, see Hoffman, supra note 4, at 718 n.60.
41. See Clifford, supra note 4, at 1811; Wortham I, supra note 39, at 381.
42. See Wortham I, supra note 39, at 381.
43. Id. at 381-83. Unfair discrimination statutes date back to the 1800s. The statutes initially were aimed at curbing
the prevalence of rebating. Rebating was a practice whereby the person selling the insurance offered to rebate a portion
of the sales commission to potential insureds as an inducement to the sale. Id. at 384-86.
44. There is little case law interpreting unfair discrimination statutes and the principles underlying them and few
of these cases delve into statutory interpretation. The most helpful decisions in this area are from Massachusetts and
Pennsylvania. See Wortham I, supra note 39, at 387; Hoffman, supra note 4, at 719.
45. See Wortham I, supra note 39, at 387-92.
46. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Insurance Comm'r, 505 Pa. 571, 585, 482 A.2d 542, 548 (1984) (quoting
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners Task Force Report on automobile rating). In a 5-2 decision, the
Hartford court held that the Pennsylvania Constitution's clear and unqualified prohibition of discrimination based on
gender could be a basis for insurance commissioner's disapproval of automobile insurer's sex based rates on the ground
that they were unfair and contrary to public policy.
47. Massachusetts Auto. Rating and Accident Prevention Bureau v. Commissioner of Ins., 384 Mass. 333, 346,
424 N.E.2d 1127, 1135 (1981).
48. Massachusetts Auto. Rating, 384 Mass. at 346, 424 N.E.2d at 1135. See also Rowell v. Harleysville Mutual
Ins. Co., 272 S.C. 108, 250 S.E.2d 111 (1978) (discussing South Carolina's statutory prohibition of cancellation of
automobile insurance policy, and the legislative finding that automobile insurance is a legal and practical necessity).
However, the South Carolina Supreme Court later overturned the Rowell opinion and held portions of the statute
unconstitutional. G-H Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co., 278 S.C. 241, 294 S.E.2d 336 (1982).
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antibody test.49 Denying the large group of seropositive individuals access to health
insurance on the basis that a small number of those individuals may suffer from AIDS
or ARC is inequitable.50
Insurers agree that the use of AIDS antibody testing will operate to deny health
insurance coverage to "some high-risk applicants,"- 51 but they believe this effect will
be mitigated by industry practice and federal law. Insurers would perform testing for
the "AIDS virus" only for new applications of individual coverage or for small group
insureds, typically less than twenty employees. 52 Thus, the majority of Americans
currently covered by health insurance, those covered by some form of group
insurance, would not be subject to testing.5 3 In addition, federal law provides that
employers with twenty or more employees must continue health care coverage for up
to eighteen months for employees who are terminated or who have their working
hours reduced. 54 It is argued that because most AIDS patients die within two years of
the onset of symptomatology, they will continue to be covered by their employer's
group health insurance, even if they are terminated.5 5 Insurers also have encouraged
an expanded use of state pools for uninsurables as a way to fill the gap left by their
testing procedures.56 Finally, the federal "safety nets" of Medicare, Medicaid, and
Social Security Disability Insurance will provide some degree of coverage to
individuals eligible under these programs. 5 7
This reasoning by the insurers is flawed in several respects. First, there is no
guarantee that seropositive individuals will be insulated by the pervasiveness of group
health insurance. In fact, because the majority of group health insurance plans are
provided through employment, pre-employment antibody testing could indirectly
result in denial of health care coverage by obviating the necessary prerequisite of
employment.5 8 Of even greater concern is the growing trend toward "self-insurance"
49. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
50. See Schatz, supra note 5, at 1788. Implicit in this criticism is the notion that Americans have a right to health
care. This concept is discussed infra at notes 143-47 and accompanying text.
51. Clifford, supra note 4, at 1821.
52. Id. at 1809.
53. Group insurance accounts for 90% of all health insurance. Given this high figure, it has been suggested that
"prohibiting AIDS testing for health insurance would have a relatively minor impact on the health insurance business."
Hunter & Angoff, Insurers Are Right on AIDS Testing, N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1987, at 39, col. 2.
54. SeeConsolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272, §§ 10001-10003, 100 Stat.
83,222-36 (1986) as modified by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085, and the Sixth Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, 100 Stat. 1874; Clifford, supra note 4, at 1821.
55. Clifford, supra note 4, at 1821.
56. See id. at 1822; E.MPLOymENT TES'nNG, supra note 7, at A:7. State sponsored health insurance pools provide
coverage to persons whose medical conditions ordinarily would prevent them from obtaining insurance by having all
health insurers in the state participate and share in any losses that occur. See Oppenheimer & Padgug, AIDS: The Risks
to Insurers, the Threat to Equity, 16 HASTINGs CENrER REP., 18, 22 (Oct. 1986) [hereinafter Oppenheimer].
57. See Congressional Hearings, supra note 29, at 346-55 (statement of Elmer W. Smith, Director, Office of
Eligibility Policy, Bureau of Eligibility, Reimbursement and Coverage, Health Care Financing Administration,
Department of Health and Human Services).
58. Although state employment discrimination statutes and regulations under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub.
L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355, prohibit discrimination against an applicant on the basis of an employment test, these statutes
require that the person be considered handicapped within the meaning of the statute. At this writing, the status of a
seropositive individual as handicapped is unsettled. See School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
See also Leonard, AIDS, Employment and Unemployment. 49 OHIo Sr. L.J. 929 (1989).
The legitimacy of testing is receiving implicit federal support by the "AIDS testing" currently practiced by the
Department of State and the Department of Defense. See EmPLOYM E TE SiNG, supra note 7, at A:6. In addition, an April
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by American businesses. It is estimated that as many as fifty percent of the firms in
the United States are now self-insured either in part or in full. 59 Self-insured firms are
free from state insurance regulations and maintain complete control over what
medical benefits and coverages are included in their insurance plans. Specifically,
there is nothing to prevent a self-insured employer from limiting its coverage of
certain high cost medical conditions, with AIDS being only one example.60
Second, the high risk pools for uninsurables mentioned as an alternative to
individual health care coverage provide little protection. At the present time, only
eleven of the fifty states have high risk insurance pools. 6' Moreover, often the
premiums for such pools are 150 percent above the normal rate, 62 making coverage
by high risk pools prohibitively expensive. In addition, employers operating with
self-insured plans may elect not to participate in risk pools. This could hasten the
trend toward self-insurance, thereby exacerbating the effect of uninsurability. 63
Third, studies have estimated that Medicare currently covers the medical
expenses of only one to three percent of patients with AIDS. To be eligible for
Medicare, one must be over sixty-five or survive a two year waiting period. 64 The
majority of persons with AIDS are between twenty and forty-nine years of age;65 the
median survival time is estimated to be twelve months. 66 Medicaid pays for the care
of twelve to sixty-five percent of AIDS patients and requires the individual to "spend
down" his or her resources to qualify for coverage. 67 These federal programs cover
only five to nineteen percent of the seropositive individuals who eventually develop
AIDS.68 Individuals with a diagnosis of ARC do not qualify for coverage, 69 and these
programs do nothing to provide coverage for non-AIDS related health care costs.
1987 poll taken by The Wall Street Journal and NBC News indicates that 42% of the over 2,000 adults surveyed
nationwide support pre-employment AIDS testing. This same poll estimated the 63% of these individuals believed insurers
should be permitted to deny life or health insurance on the basis of a positive AIDS test. See Ricklefs, AIDS Cases Prompt
a Host of Lawsuits, Wall St. J., Oct. 7, 1987, sec. 2, at 1, col. 3.
59. Oppenheimer, supra note 56, at 21.
60. See id.
61. Id. These states are: Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, North
Dakota, Tennessee, and Wisconsin. Four additional states-Maine, New Mexico, Oregon, and Washington-are estab-
lishing high risk health insurance plans this year; and, at least three additional states-California, Kansas, and South
Carolina-will consider legislation this year on the same issue. Fletcher, More States Offer High-Risk Health Plans, Bus.
INs., Feb. 1, 1988, at 1.
62. Perkins & Boyle, AIDS and Poverty: Dual Barriers to Health Care, 19 Ct.LEAeINHOUSEREv. 1283, 1290(1986)
[hereinafter Perkins].
63. Oppenheimer, supra note 56, at 22.
64. J. Iglehart, Health Policy Report: Financing the Struggle Against AIDS, 317 NEw ENG. J. MED., 180, 182
(1987) [hereinafter Iglehart].
65. Morgan & Curran, Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome: Current and Future Trends, 101 PuB. HEALTH REP.
459, 463 (1986) [hereinafter Morgan].
66. Id. at 460.
67. Iglehart, supra note 64, at 181-82. In a 1986 survey by the National Association of Public Hospitals and the
Association of American Medical Colleges' Council on Teaching Hospitals, 62% of the AIDS patients relied on Medicaid
payments, while in private hospitals, this figure decreased to 35%. Hough, supra note 24, at 4, (citing Androlis, Beers,
Bentley & Gage, The Provision and Financing of Medical Care for AIDS Patients in U.S. Public and Private Teaching
Hospitals, 258 J. A.M.A. 1343 (1987)).
68. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
69. See Congressional Hearings, supra note 29, at 354 (Statement of E. Smith, Director, Office of Eligibility
Policy, Bureau of Eligibility, Reimbursement and Coverage, Health Care Finance Administrators, Department of Health
and Human Services).
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D. Analogizing the Debate
The insurance industry's arguments in support of AIDS antibody testing and the
concerns relating to uninsurability are similarly applicable to other medical condi-
tions for which predictive blood screening tests are currently available or will be
available in the near future. For example, blood tests currently are available to detect
changes in chromosomal structure, indicating an increased likelihood of developing
cancer at some future date. 70 It is anticipated that, as medical technology advances,
similar genetic testing will be used to indicate predispositions to a variety of
illnesses. 71 A study by the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment examines
the trend of predictive blood screening and provides support for concerns that the use
of these tests by insurers to limit their financial risk may aggravate the well-
recognized limitations in the health care system in the United States. 72
E. Summarizing the Debate
The tension within the debate can be summarized as economics at odds with
equity. Insurers have a responsibility to protect the financial viability of their industry
and they assert their well-recognized right to classify risks as a means to meet this
responsibility. On the other hand, if an implicit right to adequate health care coverage
is recognized, then the use of an unreliable screening test abrogates that right without
providing acceptable alternatives. Resolution of this tension must begin with an
inquiry into the validity of both arguments. Part II of this Comment is an attempt to
initiate this analysis.
H. THE RELATIONSHIP BmvEE AIDS ANTIBODY
TESTING AND THE GOALS OF INSURANCE
A. Introduction
As suggested above, health insurers justify the use of the ELISA test as a risk
classifier on two grounds: 1) given the potentially ruinous effect of adverse selection,
risk classification is economically necessary; and, 2) risk classification is fair and
equitable.73 The principal purposes served by insurance law include economic
efficiency and fair risk distribution.7 4 Economic efficiency is "a measure of the
degree to which particular allocations or uses of resources maximize their value." 75
70. See, e.g., Note, Occupationally Induced Cancer Susceptibility: Regulating the Risk, 96 HARV. L. REv. 697
(1983); Patlak, Wayward Genes are Clues to Cancer, The Columbus Dispatch, Nov. 29, 1987, at G-6, col. 1; Quinn,
AIDS: Testing Insurance, NEWSWEEK, June 8, 1987, at 55.
71. Kolata, Genetic Screening Raises Questions For Employers and Insurers, 232 ScIENcE 317 (1986); Kolata,
Manic.Depression: Is It Inherited?, 232 SciENcE 575 (1986); Lapp, , The Limits of Genetic Inquiry, 17 HASTNGS CENTER
REP. 5 (Aug.-Sept. 1987); Lewin, Researchers Hunt for Alzheimer's Disease Gene, 232 SciEscE 448 (1986); Meissen,
et al., Predictive Testingfor Huntington's Disease With Use of a DNA Marker, 318 NEw ENG. J. MED. 535 (1988); Schatz,
supra note 5, at 1798 n.100.
72. U.S. CONGRESS OFFCE OF TECHNOLOGY Assusas.ENT, MEDiCAL TESTING AND HEALTH INSURANCE, OTA-H-384
(1988) [hereinafter TESntNG AND INSURANCE].
73. See CumMAs, supra note 32, at 3.
74. ABRAMAM, supra note 31, at 9.
75. Id. at 10.
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Structuring insurance to reduce the cost of insurance and the costs of loss prevention
promotes economic efficiency. 76 Risk distribution is the spreading of costs among the
policy holders as a group. The fairness of risk distribution depends upon the manner
in which this distribution is accomplished and is based on societal values and
norms.
77
The primary issue, then, is whether the economic justifications for such testing
outweigh, or should be permitted to outweigh, the principle of fair risk distribution
which underlies both public and private insurance in the United States. The remainder
of this Comment will examine the insurance goals of ecomically efficient risk
classification and fair risk distribution in the context of AIDS antibody testing as a
risk classification scheme, assessing whether "AIDS testing" and, similar predictive
screening tests by analogy, provide a proper balance between these two goals.
B. Risk Classification
The goal of risk classification is to determine the expected losses of each insured
and to place insureds with similar expected losses into the same class so that each may
be charged the same rate. 78 Risk classification allows insurers to compete effectively
for protection dollars by charging different rates based upon expected losses, offering
lower prices to lower risk individuals. 79 This concept assumes that purchasing
insurance is only one way to protect against risk and that if insurance becomes too
costly, alternative measures of self-protection will be taken, such as maintaining
large emergency cash reserves. 80 This basic assumption is flawed in the context of
individual health insurance. The spiraling costs of medical care in the United States
in recent years have made self-insurance a myth more than a reality. 8' Nevertheless,
classification of insureds into risk categories is said to be worthwhile when the gains
from additional sales and lower payouts outweigh the costs of classification plus the
costs of any lost sales. 82
C. Evaluating the Economic Rationale of Risk Classification
Efficient risk classification depends on two factors. First, it should accurately
reflect differences among classes in expected losses. Second, it should create loss
prevention incentives on the part of insureds. 83 Accuracy can be evaluated by
examining the separation variable and the reliability variable of the risk classifier. 84
The incentive value of a risk classification can be measured by the degree to which
the classification is based on variables within the insured's control. 85
76. See id. at 11.
77. See id.
78. Id. at 68.,
79. Id. at 67.
80. See id.
81. Wortham 1, supra note 39, at 352, 353.
82. ABRAHAM, supra note 31, at 67.
83. Id. at 79.
84. See id. at 69-71.
85. See id. at 71.
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1. The Separation Variable
The separation variable measures the degree to which insureds in different
classes will experience different expected losses. The difference between the
expected losses should be significant enough to warrant charging different premiums.
As the overlap in expected losses increases between the various groups, the economic
justification for the classification decreases. 86
Clearly, seropositive individuals have a greater chance of experiencing AIDS
related losses than do seronegative individuals. The separation variable attempts to
measure the extent to which AIDS related losses differ from non-AIDS related losses.
Approaching the comparison from different perspectives yields different results.
For example, it may be appropriate to compare AIDS related losses with testicular
cancer losses. The basis for this comparison is that ninety-three percent of the persons
reported with AIDS are male; the average age is thirty-seven. 87 Testicular cancer is
the most common form of cancer among men age twenty to thirty-four and the second
most common cancer among men age thirty-five to thirty-nine. 88
One study estimates that 9,368 persons with AIDS were alive at any time during
1984. The number of days spent by those persons in U.S. hospitals during that year
was estimated to be 328,000 at a cost of 271 million dollars. 89 In 1977, the number
of hospital days and associated costs for all testicular cancer patients under sixty-five
years of age was 375,000 and 82 million dollars, respectively. 90 Even if one were to
correct the 1977 figures to reflect the general increase in hospital costs between 1977
and 1984, 91 the hospital expenses relating to testicular cancer would be 215 million
dollars, roughly seventy-nine percent of the hospital costs associated with AIDS.
However, because the estimated median survival time for persons with AIDS is
estimated at twelve months,92 it may be more appropriate to compare AIDS related
costs with costs incurred by cancer patients during the last year of life. One study
examined the personal medical expenditures93 of 1,054 persons under sixty-five years
of age having breast, colon-rectal, or lung cancer. 94 The study revealed that
expenditures averaged 21,219 dollars per person in 1980, 30,300 dollars per person
when adjusted for 1984 dollars, for the last year of life.95 No significant differences
86. See id. at 69, 70. A similar feature implicit in any risk classification is homogeneity. Homogeneity reflects
social concerns more than economic efficiency and is discussed in the context of fair risk distribution, see infra notes
133-37 and accompanying text.
87. Morgan, supra note 65, at 463.
88. H. PAGE, CANCER RATEs AND RISKS 116 (3d ed. 1985). American males have a 0.3% chance of developing
testicular cancer in their lifetime.
89. See Scitovsky, supra note 3, at 7, 10. The figures were obtained by multiplying the average length of hospital
stay times the average number of hospital admissions per year, and multiplying that figure (319,000) by the average
charge per hospital days ($850).
90. W. Sstmt, A PROFILE OF HEALn AND DtsEsSE IN AtEmi.cA: CAcER 56, 57 (1987). All figures have been
rounded up.
91. From 1972 to 1983, total hospital expenditures increased at an average annual rate of 14.8%. HosprrAL
SrATsIrzcs xxv (Am. Hosp. Ass'n. 1987).
92. Morgan, supra note 65, at 460.
93. Personal medical expenditures includes hospital services, physician services, and outpatient services costs.
94. Long, Medical Expenditures of Terminal Cancer Patients During the Last Year of Life, 21 INQUIRY 315, 317
(1984) [hereinafter Long]. These cancers account for 47% to 48% of all cancer deaths.
95. Id. at 318.
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were found in expenditures by age group. 96 In comparison, a 1986 survey by the
Health Insurance Association of America and the American Council of Life Insurance
estimated that direct medical costs were 36,159 dollars per case for AIDS and 33,332
dollars per case for ARC. 97
The latter comparison suggests that the direct medical costs of AIDS, although
daunting in the aggregate, are not dissimilar to costs of other terminal illnesses. In
addition, studies have suggested that terminal illness care costs can be minimized
significantly by substituting costly inpatient hospital care with less costly care
settings, such as hospice care, home care programs and extended care facilities. 98
Increased use of these less costly alternatives could significantly lower the per patient
costs of AIDS.
2. The Reliability Variable
Reliability is the degree to which the method of classification is verifiable and
immune to error or fraud. 99 As noted earlier, a single ELISA test has a ten to fifteen
percent inaccuracy rate, which can be minimized if insurers follow the suggested
protocol of follow-up ELISA and Western blot technique tests.' 00 While the
insurance industry may endorse such a testing protocol,10' no rule or regulation
compelling insurers to follow this verification procedure currently exists. In addition,
the increase in the cost of classification may discourage insurers from implementing
such a testing procedure.
Notwithstanding the possibility of false positives, the inherent unreliability of
the AIDS antibody test to predict AIDS related losses remains. Viewing the
predictive ability of the ELISA test from a position most favorable to the insurance
industry, the ELISA test can predict the onset of AIDS or ARC in the two to five year
period following the test only fifty percent of the time.' 02 This weakness in
predictability and the chance for error in test results seriously undermine the
reliability of the ELISA test as an efficient risk classifier.
3. The Incentive Value
The worth of any classification scheme is measured by its ability to create loss
prevention incentives on the part of the insureds.10 3 Theoretically, the variable on
96. Id. at 321.
97. Hough, supra note 24, at 3. See also Fox & Thomas, AIDS Cost Analysis and Social Policy, 15 LAw, MEo.
& HEALTH CAEn 186, 206 (1987/88) (comparing the health care cost of AIDS patients to the health care costs of other
illnesses).
98. See Long, supra note 94, at 325, 326; See also Brooks & Smyth-Staruch, Hospice Home Care Cost Savings
to Third-Party Insurers, 26 MEo. CARE 691 (1984); Savings Envisioned in Home AIDS Care, N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1987,
at 23, col. 3.
99. ABRAHAM, supra note 31, at 71.
100. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
101. See, e.g., Clifford, supra note 4, at 1812 n.36.
102. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text. The 50% figure is arrived at by adding the high end estimates
posited by the CDC. Refinements in testing methodology will improve predictability and will strengthen the efficiency
argument of health insurers. However, at the time of this writing, an alternative to the ELISA test does not exist.
103. ABRAHAM, supra note 31, at 71, 79; Wortham, The Economics of Insurance Classification: The Sound of One
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which the classification is based should be one over which the insured can exercise
control. For example, smoking is a controllable risk which may be used by insurers
in its classification scheme. Charging a lower health care insurance premium for
nonsmokers is an incentive for individuals to stop smoking, thereby lowering or
preventing the expected loss to the insurance companies.' 0 4 Thus, the ability of the
classifier to influence insured behavior in a positive way is an indicator of the
classifier's efficiency.
With AIDS antibody testing, the threshold question is whether exposure to the
"AIDS virus" is within the control of the individual. With respect to blood
transfusion recipients, infants, and children, the obvious answer is no.' 05 The
intravenous drug abuser situation is somewhat analogous to the smoker.10 6 Both
smoking and drug abuse are addictive behavior. The initial exposure is voluntary and,
at least for the smoker, is entered into with knowledge of its hazardous health
effects.' 0 7 The extent to which intravenous drug abusers are aware of the risk of HIV
exposure is unclear. The extimated 750,000 Americans who inject drugs intrave-
nously on a routine basis'0 3 are generally unorganized, poorly educated, and have less
interaction with the health care delivery system than other groups who participate in
high risk behavior.10 9
These characteristics of the group have implications not only to the extent that
the intravenous drug abuser may avoid exposure to HIV, but also to the extent that
the individual may terminate the high risk behavior. The USPHS has recognized that
"addictive behavior is not often changed without specific drug treatment,"" 0 and
that the current capacity for drug treatment is inadequate."'
Even if it is agreed that intravenous drug abuse is within the control of the
individual and that the threat of AIDS is an incentive to end the high risk behavior,
the reality is that this group is of relatively minor interest to the private health
insurers. Probably the vast majority of intravenous drug abusers are, or will be,
included in the twelve to sixty-five percent of patients whose medical costs are
covered by federal programs.
For the majority of those at risk, homosexual males, bisexual individuals, and
those who have sexual contact with high risk individuals, the ability to avoid
exposure is not guaranteed. The "AIDS virus" leaves no scarlet letter on its carriers
Invisible Hand Clapping, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 835, 876, 877 (1986) [hereinafter Wortham II]; See also Schatz, supra note
5, at 1797-98.
104. The classification based on a positive ELISA test is in stark contrast to the discount for the nonsmoker situation.
With AIDS, insurers are not providing the incentive of lower premium costs for the nonexposed. Rather, insurers are
denying coverage to seropositives. This position does nothing to minimize expected losses, but merely redistributes the
expected losses to others. This effect, known as externalities, is discussed infra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
105. It is estimated that, in 1986, 1.4% of all AIDS cases occurred in children under 13 years of age; 2.0% occurred
in transfusion recipients; and, 1.0% occurred in hemophilia patients (although the route of transmission for hemophiliacs
is blood transfusion, they are segregated for reporting purposes). Morgan, supra note 65, at 461.
106. In 1986, it is estimated that 25% of all AIDS cases occurred in intravenous drug abusers. Morgan, supra note
65, at 461-62.
107. Knowledge of the risks of smoking is so pervasive that citation to this fact is omitted.
108. Coolfont Report, supra note 1, at 343.
109. Id. at 346.
110. Id.
11. Id.
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to warn off sexual partners and, as the incidence of AIDS in the heterosexual
population increases,112 the ability to avoid exposure by avoiding sexual contact
decreases. To require sexual abstinence in exchange for health insurance would be
impractical and unfair. The argument in response, to this assertion is that an individual
can avoid exposure to the "AIDS virus. 11 3 Implicit in this argument is the
assumption that homosexual activity is a preference rather than an orientation.
However, the bulk of the research on this point is contrary. 14 Further, once a positive
status is obtained, it cannot be reversed as can one's status as a smoker.
The reality is that a classification based on a positive AIDS antibody test will not
reduce losses but instead may increase the costs of externalities. 115 Externalities are
transaction costs which are created when the costs of one's activities accrue to
someone else and are not compensated. 116 Because insurers are proposing denial of
health care coverage to AIDS antibody positive individuals, this group may be
deterred from seeking early or preventive health care. In addition, the health care
costs resulting from accidental injury or unrelated illness are not covered for these
individuals. When individuals who are denied insurance become seriously ill,
whether from AIDS, a fall from a tree, or from some other catastrophic illness, they
will seek and receive some form of publicly or privately funded health care. These
costs will be absorbed by taxes or redistributed to other patients who are insured and
otherwise able to pay. 17
D. Summarizing the Economic Rationale for Risk Classification
The above analysis evaluates the economic efficiency of a positive AIDS
antibody test as a risk classifier by examining the degree to which it can accurately
predict expected losses and the degree to which it provides incentives for the insured
to alter his behavior. The analysis shows that the test is valuable from a predictive
standpoint only fifty percent of the time, at best. The test may identify AIDS related
losses, but from an expected loss perspective, losses from AIDS are not significantly
different than those from other catastrophic illnesses and may, in fact, be lower. From
a loss prevention incentive perspective, the test does not promote efficiency but
merely redistributes the costs of illness and may increase the costs borne by others
because of the decrease in preventive or early health care for affected persons.
112. Id. at 343; Morgan, supra note 65, at 462.
113. Some insurers view AIDS as a "self-inflicted" injury. Perkins, supra note 62, at 1289, 1290; see also
Hammond, supra note 31, at 146.
114. See A. BELL & M. WEINBERG, HobosExALrrtEs, A STUDY OF DivERsrrY AMloNo MEsN AND WO.MEN 121-28
(1978); I. BIEBER, HOmOSEXuALtrrY, A PSYCHOANALrIC STUDY 3-18, 303-19 (1962). See F. WnIrrA, MALE HotosEK-
UALrTY IN FOUR SocITiEs 32-67 (1986); Sexual promiscuity has been implicated in the spread of AIDS within the
homosexual community. However, such assumptions should not be exaggerated. A recent study has found that the median
number of lifetime sexual partners among sexually active homosexual individuals to be 50. Ross, Social and Behavioral
Aspects of Male Homosexuality, 70 MED. CLINICS N. Ami. 527, 543 (1986).
115. Wortham II, supra note 103, at 878.
116. Id. at 874; ABRAHAM, supra note 31, at 17.
117. Wortham 11, supra note 103, at 875.
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E. Evaluating AIDS Antibody Testing in the Context of Risk Distributional
Fairness
Risk distributional fairness contemplates the goal that efficiency should not be
attained at the expense of fairness and justice and recognizes that a certain amount of
risk distribution in insurance is morally correct. Risk distributional fairness embraces
not only principles of distributive justice, but also civil rights law concepts. 18
In the field of insurance law, risk distributional fairness traditionally has been
recognized in statutes and judicial decisions involving fair and unfair discrim-
ination.119 While on the one hand, it is fair for each insured to pay according to his
expected losses, the insurance industry's discretion in classifying individuals has
been limited by regulations and rulings based on societal values and public policy
concerns. For example, federal law forbids classification by race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin in employer sponsored insurance plans.12 0 Many state statutes
go beyond the federal law and proscribe classification based on physical or mental
impairments or on a specific genetic trait. 21 Such regulations and statutes recognize
that "actuarial justification does not operate without limit"' 2 2 and that societal values
may outweigh statistical validity.' 2 3
With this limitation in mind, it is necessary to examine whether an insurance
classification based on a positive AIDS antibody test is fair in its distribution of the
risks. An otherwise statistically valid risk classifier may offend distributional fairness
in two ways. First, it may be considered inadmissible based on egalitarian principles.
Second, even though admissible, it may be objectionable based on public policy
grounds. 24 The egalitarian aspect is composed of two features-differential inaccu-
racy and control-causality. Differential inaccuracy measures the extent to which the
classifier unevenly distributes its burden of inaccuracy.12 5 Control-causality measures
the extent to which the classification is based on a variable within the insured's
control. ' 26 The public policy aspect involves societal values and norms which may
override the justification for the use of a particular classifier. 2 7
1. Differential Inaccuracy
Given the ELISA test's inability to accurately predict actual losses, allocating
resources based upon this test alone may not only be inefficient 28 but also inequitable.
118. See ABRAMMAt, supra note 31, at 18-31; Vortham 1, supra note 39, at 361.
119. See supra notes 40-48 and accompanying text; Wortham I, supra note 39, at 384-93.
120. Arizona Governing Comm. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073 (1983); Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v.
Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978) (interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e
to 2000e-17 (1982)),
121. Id. at 367; Schatz, supra note 5, at 1797-98.
122. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Insurance Comm'r., 65 Pa. Commw. 249, 255-56, 442 A.2d 382, 385,
aff'd, 505 Pa. 571, 482 A.2d 542 (1984).
123. Wortham I, supra note 39, at 389.
124. ABRsAHAI, supra note 31, at 92; Wortham 11, supra note 103, at 885.
125. ABRAHVII, supra note 31, at 85-89.
126. Id. at 89-92.
127. Id. at 92-95.
128. See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text; ABRAaiss, supra note 31, at 85.
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If seropositive individuals are provided insurance at a rate based on their seropositivity,
the inaccuracy of the test will result in this class bearing the entire economic burden
of AIDS related health care costs because a small percentage of positive individuals
will experience the associated high losses. 129 The burden of inaccuracy is distributed
unevenly with the majority of insureds in the class being used as a means to ensure
that the true high risk minority are charged higher premiums. 130 This differential
inaccuracy is objectionable on egalitarian grounds. Absent a more accurate classifi-
cation methodology, a broader and more even distribution of the risk would treat all
insureds with more equal concern and respect. 131
Balancing efficiency with equity may require a certain amount of inequality in
the distribution of the economic burden. 132 In evaluating the degree of inequality to
be tolerated, class characteristics are relevant and provide some guidance. In general,
differential inaccuracy is more tolerable if the class is homogeneous. Homogeneity
measures the extent to which all of the risks in a class have similar expected losses.
Only if all risks in a class are similar can it be argued that it is fair to charge each class
member the same rate. 133
In the class of AIDS seropositive individuals, homogeneity is minimal. With
ELISA as the classifier, the class is composed of both the true seropositive
individuals who will incur AIDS or ARC related losses and those who will incur no
AIDS or ARC related losses, either because the individual is falsely positive or
because the individual does not develop AIDS symptomatology. 134 Thus, the ELISA
test does not produce a homogeneous class, and, to the degree that it fails to do so,
the associated differential inaccuracy is intolerable.
Another class characteristic relevant to risk distribution is heterogeneity, the
extent to which the subsidization of high risk insureds by low risk insureds is shared
evenly among different classes.135 Even if the heterogeneity of the AIDS seropositive
class is accepted, it may be objectionable nonetheless if other classes, although
heterogeneous, are relatively more homogeneous than the AIDS seropositive class. 136
This difference in homogeneity places a greater burden on the less homogeneous
(more heterogeneous) class than on the other classes and provides additional support
for objecting to the ELISA classifier on egalitarian grounds. 137
2. Control-Causality
The risk distributional fairness of a risk classifier also can be assessed from a
control-causality perspective. Even if a risk variable is statistically associated with
loss, its use as a classifier may be criticized for its failure to allow a responsible
129. See ABRAAM, supra note 31, at 85, 87.
130. See id.
131. Id. at 87, 88.
132. Id. at 88.
133. Id. at 74; Cut mMNs, supra note 32, at 63-65.
134. See supra notes 16-24 and accompanying text.
135. ABRAH m, supra note 31, at 88.
136. Id. at 75.
137. Id. at 88.
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individual the opportunity to alter the effect of being grouped. 138 From the egalitarian
perspective, ajust distribution of risks would ignore characteristics outside the control
of the individual. 139 The prohibition of sex-based life insurance classification exem-
plifies the control-causality objection.140 Because gender is immutable and has no
causal connection to longevity, gender cannot provide the basis for insurance
responsibility. 14'
Although seropositivity may be used to establish a causal link between exposure
to the "AIDS virus," it has been argued here that, for all practical purposes,
exposure to the virus is not within the control of an individual.142 Thus, from a
distributional fairness perspective, it is unjust to impose such an economic burden on
this class, and the goal of risk distributional fairness is not satisfied by the use of a
risk classification scheme based on a positive ELISA test.
3. Public Policy Consideration
The public interest in insurance classification merits particularly close scrutiny
in the area of health care coverage. The need for adequate health care insurance has
grown as health care costs have increased, 43 and the public has chosen private
insurers as the primary vehicle for providing this coverage.144 The crucial role of
private insurers in our national scheme of protection is evidenced by the tax
advantages provided to employment related health insurance.' 45 In addition, the
taxpayer funded insurance plans of Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security
Disability Insurance demonstrate a national intent to assure adequate insurance
protection to all citizens.' 46
The need for insurance and the public choice of private insurance to meet this
need have created "an obligation on behalf of society to be concerned about the
legitimacy of the classification schemes used by insurers to decide who can buy
insurance, how much it will cost, and who will be covered." 147 A direct effect of
AIDS antibody and similar predictive testing will be the unavailability of insurance
for a growing number of people. Any decision on the acceptability of these tests as
insurance risk classifiers must address whether uninsurability comports with a public
policy favoring insurance availability.
138. Id. at 89.
139. See Wvortham 11, supra note 103, at 884; ABRAAM, supra note 31, at 27.
140. See supra note 114.
141. ABRAANti, supra note 31, at 90; Brilmayer, Hekeler, Laycock & Sullivan, Sex Discrimination in Employer-
Sponsored Insurance Plans: A Legal and Demographic Analysis, 47 U. CMt. L. Rv. 505 (1980).
142. See supra notes 105-14 and accompanying text.
143. In 1983, health care expenditures constituted $355.4 billion, 10.8% of the gross national product. Wortham I,
supra note 39, at 397.
144. See id. at 397-402.
145. Wortham 1, supra note 39, at 398.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 400.
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HI. CONCLUSION
This Comment has examined the justification for AIDS antibody testing from the
perspective of the traditional insurance goals of economic efficiency and fair risk
distribution. It has demonstrated weaknesses in the economic validity of such testing
and has raised serious moral and legal questions regarding the distributional fairness
of such testing. If AIDS antibody testing cannot be adequately justified from these
perspectives, the true motivation of health insurers in demanding their continued
"unfettered discretion" 148 to test bears close scrutiny. Critics argue that insurers are
not attempting to preserve fair discrimination but are attempting to test "without
regard to social costs" ' 149 and to skirt the issue of the growing problem of
uninsurability in the United States. 150
In evaluating the arguments for and against the continued use of testing,
insurance regulators, judges, and the public must consider the advances in medical
technology that will make similar testing available to detect cancer, diabetes,
Parkinson's disease, and other catastrophic illnesses. The ability to perform such tests
is a reality today, and as costs decrease, their use will be demanded by insurers on
grounds similar to those of AIDS antibody testing. The question of who should bear
the risk of the AIDS epidemic should not be viewed in the narrow context of AIDS
itself, but rather in the broader context of the objectives of insurance and the basic
values of society.
Judith A. Berman
148. Wortham II, supra note 103, at 885.
149. Schatz, supra note 5, at 1798.
150. See id.
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